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I. INTRODUCTION
Sadly, religious liberty has become a matter of great
controversy and division in our society. Although not so many years
ago there was a nearly unanimous, bi-partisan consensus supporting
the legal protection of religious liberty from laws substantially
burdening the free exercise of religion,1 irreconcilable differences
among us over contraception, abortion, sexuality, and the nature of
marriage have made religious liberty a divisive partisan issue.2
Although most religious liberty cases concern religious minorities
whose religiously-motivated conduct has been disregarded “by an
insensitive majority,”3 a handful of cases involving Christian-owned
businesses and ministries claiming a religious liberty right to refuse
to supply contraceptives and abortifacients to their students and
employees or goods and services for same-sex marriages have led
progressives to turn their backs on religious liberty.4 As Professor
Laycock puts it, progressives “persist in demanding not only the
right to live their own lives by their own values, but also the right to
force religious objectors to assist them in doing so.”5 As a result,
“[r]eligious liberty is at risk”6 wherever progressive elites are in
power.
Onto this desolate stage strode Jack Phillips, a wedding cake
artist who deeply and reasonably believes “that ‘God’s intention for
marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the
union of one man and one woman.’”7 Phillips considers his wedding
cakes artistic expression celebrating the beauty of marriage as God
designed marriage.8 Each one of his wedding cakes is custom made.
As Phillips’s attorneys explain:

As Professor Douglas Laycock observes, “When Congress passed the federal
RFRA in 1993, it acted unanimously in the House and 97–3 in the Senate.”
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
839, 845. However, in a matter of only a few years, Congress went from nearly
unanimous support for religious liberty “to partisan gridlock.” Id. at 846.
2 Id.
3 Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
353, 354, 400 (2018).
4 See Laycock, supra note 1, at 846.
5 Id. at 879–880.
6 Id. at 880.
7 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
8 See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16111) [hereinafter “Petitioner’s Brief”].
1
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Much like an artist sketching on canvas or a sculptor
using clay, Phillips meticulously crafts each wedding
cake through hours of sketching, sculpting, and
hand-painting. The cake, which serves as the iconic
centerpiece of the marriage celebration, announces
through Phillips’s voice that a marriage has occurred
and should be celebrated.9
Although Phillips is happy to serve all people without regard
to race, religion, or sexual orientation,10 “he cannot design custom
cakes that express ideas or celebrate events at odds with his religious
beliefs.”11 Thus, Phillips will not design cakes celebrating
Halloween or divorce, or those promoting hateful messages aimed
at racial minorities or gays and lesbians.12
In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, a same-sex
couple, visited Phillips’s bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and
“requested that Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their
same-sex wedding.”13 Phillips informed the couple that based upon
his sincerely held religious beliefs, he does not create custom
wedding cakes celebrating same-sex marriages, but he also told
them that “he would be happy to make and sell them any other baked
goods.”14 In other words, Phillips was happy to serve LGBT
customers in general, but he believed it would “displease God” if he
were to create wedding cakes for same-sex marriages.15
Although the same-sex couple was easily able to find
another baker to create and bake a multi-tiered, rainbow-layered
wedding cake—in fact, the other baker did not even charge the gay
couple for the cake16—they filed a sexual orientation discrimination
complaint
against
Phillips
under
Colorado’s
public
accommodations law. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruled
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 8–9.
11 Id. at 9.
12 Id.
13 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015),
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Notice that the record in this case makes clear
that Craig and Mullins requested a cake “celebrating” their marriage, one which
was designed to recognize that their relationship was a marriage and was
something to be celebrated. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 277 (“Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art, that he can
honor God through his artistic talents, and that he would displease God by
creating cakes for same-sex marriages.”).
16 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 10.
9
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that Phillips was guilty of sexual orientation discrimination and
issued an order requiring Phillips to “cease and desist from
discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them
wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to heterosexual
couples.”17 In other words, the order mandated that Phillips must
create custom wedding cakes celebrating same-sex marriages if he
creates cakes celebrating traditional marriages between one man and
one woman.18 In effect, if he creates art he wishes to create, he is
compelled to create art he does not wish to create. At Supreme Court
oral argument in this case, Justice Ginsburg asked the gay couple’s
lawyer, David Cole, what would happen if Phillips would design a
wedding cake “that said: God bless the union of Ruth and Marty.”
Cole replied: “[T]hen he would have to say God bless the union of
Dave and Craig” because otherwise it would constitute
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.19 Thus, the
Commission’s order was so broad as to require Phillips to include
religious blessings on cakes celebrating same-sex marriages.
After the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Phillips’s First
Amendment claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses,20 the Supreme Court of the United Sates granted his
petition for certiorari21 and held that the Commission’s actions
“violated the Free Exercise Clause[] and its order must be set
aside.”22 The purpose of this Article is to measure the impact of the
Court’s decision on religious liberty and compelled speech claims
going forward. Although the Court did not decide Phillips’s free
speech claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop,23 the majority opinion24 and
the concurring opinions contain a great deal of grist for the mill.25
Moreover, the Court’s landmark compelled speech decision in
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra26 in June
2018 seems to strongly support a future freedom of speech claim
involving a wedding cake artist or other expressive vendor

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 (citation omitted).
Id.
19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(No. 16-111).
20 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272.
21 85 U.S.L.W. 3593 (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-111).
22 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
23 Id. at 1723–24.
24 Id. at 1723–32.
25 See id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
17
18
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compelled by law to create art or expression contrary to his or her
conscience.
This Article will explain and analyze the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence in Masterpiece Cakeshop. First, I will
focus on the free speech issue in the case and the Court’s decision
to avoid reaching the merits of that claim. Next, I will focus on the
free exercise holding in the case with the goal of locating that
holding within the Court’s pre-existing Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. Finally, I will suggest that Masterpiece Cakeshop is
perhaps the first step in a future restoration of constitutionallyprotected religious liberty.

II. THE COMPELLED SPEECH ISSUE IN MASTERPIECE
CAKESHOP
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right of free
speech includes the right not to be compelled to speak.27 Alexander
Solzhenitsyn has captured the essence of the right not to speak as
being based upon each individual’s conscience and commitment to
the truth as he or she understands it. In an essay titled Live Not By
Lies,28 Solzhenitsyn said, “let us refuse to say that which we do not
think,” and went on to explain that an honest man worthy of the
respect of both his children and his contemporaries “[w]ill not
depict, foster or broadcast a single idea which he can only see is
false or a distortion of the truth whether it be in painting, sculpture,
photography, technical science, or music.”29 It is difficult to imagine
any deprivation of liberty greater than being compelled by
government to express an idea you believe to be not only untrue, but
untrue to your understanding of God’s version of the truth.
The Supreme Court has made clear that government may
neither “compel the dissemination of its own preferred message . . .
[n]or may it compel one private speaker to disseminate the message
See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Live Not By Lies (1974), in ORTHODOXY TODAY,
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/SolhenitsynLies.php (last visited Jan. 2,
2019).
29 Id. (“Solzhenitsyn penned this essay in 1974 and it circulated among
Moscow’s intellectuals at the time. It is dated Feb. 12, the same day that secret
police broke into his apartment and arrested him. The next day he was exiled to
West Germany. The essay is a call to moral courage and serves as light to all
who value truth.”).
27
28
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of another private speaker.”30 The landmark case recognizing the
“no compelled speech” doctrine is West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,31 the case in which the Court struck down
mandatory flag salutes in public schools and explained its ruling in
these unforgettable words of Justice Jackson:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us.32
Although it was once possible to read Barnette as only
prohibiting government from compelling affirmations of belief,
such as the Pledge of Allegiance, it soon became clear that the
compelled speech doctrine also forbids government from
compelling the dissemination of unwanted expression. Consider, for
example, Wooley v. Maynard,33 the famous case concerning the
license plate motto “Live Free or Die,” in the state of New
Hampshire. Mr. Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness who was
conscientiously opposed to displaying that motto, covered it with

Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
31 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
32 Id. at 642. Justice Jackson further justified this decision protecting freedom of
thought and expression from compelled unity of expression in these eloquent
words:
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so
strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.
Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from
any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what
doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such
attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort
from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber
of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and
dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity,
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian
enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent
soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.
Id. at 641.
33 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
30
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tape on his license plate.34 The state of New Hampshire, somehow
missing the irony of its actions, repeatedly prosecuted Maynard for
covering up its libertarian credo.35 The Supreme Court of the United
States held that New Hampshire may not require drivers in the state
to display the state motto and announced the “no compelled speech”
rule in clear and unqualified language. “We begin,” said the Wooley
Court, “with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”36 In other
words, the government may neither silence those who wish to speak,
nor put words in the mouths of those who wish not to speak.37 A
state’s interest in dissemination of its values does not “outweigh an
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier
for such message.”38
The Supreme Court has also made clear that the compelled
speech doctrine extends to the right of one private individual to
refuse to foster or convey the ideas or expression of another private
individual, even when the issue arises in the context of a public
accommodations law. In Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,39 a case involving a sexual
orientation
discrimination
complaint
under
a
public
accommodations law in the context of the Boston St. Patrick’s Day
parade, the parade organizer was ordered by the state court to allow
GLIB, a gay and lesbian group, “to march in the parade as a way to
express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals.”40 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous
Court, held that the state court order violated the First Amendment
and compared the idea of speaker autonomy—the right of the
speaker to shape her “expression by speaking on one subject while
remaining silent on another”—to that of a composer of a musical
Mr. Maynard testified that the motto was contrary to his religious belief that,
as a member of Jehovah’s Kingdom, he was the recipient of “everlasting life.”
Id. at 707 n.2. It also violated his political belief “that life is more precious than
freedom.” Id.
35 New Hampshire law makes it a misdemeanor to cover or obscure the
numbers or letters on a license plate. Id. at 707. Maynard was charged and
convicted thrice, served fifteen days in jail, and finally sued for an injunction
against further enforcement of the law. Id. at 708–09.
36 Id. at 714.
37 Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion further explained that “[t]he right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’” Id. (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 717.
39 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
40 Id. at 561.
34
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score who selects which notes to include and which to exclude.41
Although state law had classified the parade as a place of public
accommodation, the Court held that the Free Speech Clause applied
because “once the expressive character of both the parade and the
marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that
the state court’s application of the statute had the effect of declaring
the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.”42 Thus,
ruled the Court in Hurley, the right of a speaker to decide what to
say and what not to say lies “beyond the government’s power to
control.”43
In Obergefell v. Hodges,44 the case in which the Supreme
Court created a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion contained powerful dictum designed to
reassure people of faith that their views about marriage were not
viewed by the Court as either unworthy or unacceptable: “Many
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong” said Justice Kennedy in
Obergefell, “reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable
religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs
are disparaged here.”45 In even further reassuring dictum, the
Obergefell Court explicitly stated that “[t]he First Amendment
ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling
and so central to their lives and faiths.”46 Thus, unlike racist
opposition to interracial marriage, which is indecent and
dishonorable, the Obergefell majority took great pains to
characterize religious opposition to same-sex marriage as decent and
honorable.47
Id. at 574. Justice Souter concluded that by compelling the parade organizer
to permit GLIB to march in the parade, the State violated “the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message.” Id. at 573.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 575. For a decision protecting a for-profit corporation from being
compelled to disseminate the message of other speakers, see Pacific Gas &
Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(concluding a law requiring the appellant to distribute another person’s message
in the “extra space” in its billing envelopes violates First Amendment).
44 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
45 Id. at 2602.
46 Id. at 2607.
47 See Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement is Not Always Discrimination: On
Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 123 (2018) (arguing that support for marriage as a conjugal union of
husband and wife is essentially different from racist opposition to interracial
marriage).
41
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Now, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips presented
Justice Kennedy and the Court with an opportunity to live up to that
promise of respect and tolerance for his sincerely held religious
beliefs about marriage. Since the law protecting speakers and artists
from compelled speech was both clear and strong, the only obstacle
in Phillips’s path was to convince the Court that his custom wedding
cakes qualify as artistic expression. In other words, are his custom
wedding cakes more like barbeque pork served by a restaurant48 or
like a painting or sculpture created by an artist?49 One of the amicus
briefs opposing Phillips in this case, written by First Amendment
scholars who normally come out on the side of free speech, candidly
admits that the government may not compel persons who create
speech or artistic expression, such as painters, photographers,
videographers, graphic designers, printers and singers, “to record,
celebrate, or promote events they disapprove of, including same-sex
weddings.”50 But somehow this brief concludes that free speech
protection does not extend to wedding cake artists, such as Phillips.
Cake is food—not speech—it argues.51
Surely, a pizzeria cannot claim its pizzas or breadsticks
involve First Amendment expression. A wedding vendor who rents
chairs, tables and tablecloths is not engaging in an expressive
enterprise. So much depends on the facts. At oral argument in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Solicitor General Francisco argued that Jack
Phillips’s custom cakes “are essentially synonymous with a
traditional sculpture except for the medium used.”52 In other words,
Phillips is a sculptor who creates art from cake dough rather than
clay or marble. He also paints using cake as his canvas. The Solicitor
General suggested that a workable test with respect to a service that
is part-art and part-utilitarian is to ask whether it is “predominantly
For example, at oral argument Justice Breyer suggested that maybe the owner
of a barbeque restaurant might believe “he had special barbeque” that should be
protected as free speech. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 18.
49 For example, the Court has unanimously concluded that the First Amendment
“unquestionably” protects the abstract paintings of artists such as Jackson
Pollack even though they do not convey a readily “articulable message.” Hurley
v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
50 Brief for Am. Unity Fund, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
51 Id. at 5 (“A chef, however brilliant, cannot claim a Free Speech Clause right
not to serve certain people at his restaurant, even if his dishes look stunning. The
same is true for bakers, even ones who create beautiful cakes for use at
weddings.”). This brief does concede, at least, that even cakes are protected as
speech when they include “written or graphic messages.” Id. at 10.
52 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 40.
48
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art or predominantly utilitarian.”53 In other words, do people pay
very high prices for “these highly sculpted” wedding cakes because
they taste good and have nutritional value, or “because of their
artistic qualities?”54
As Phillips’s lawyers argued, his “wedding cakes are his
artistic expression because he intends to, and does in fact,
communicate through them.”55 His custom wedding cakes serve as
the “iconic” centerpiece of wedding celebrations, and even those
cakes that do not contain words clearly express that a wedding has
occurred, that the couple’s union is a “marriage,” and that the
marriage is a matter for celebration.56 Indeed, as the Colorado Court
of Appeals described the facts in this case, when the same-sex
couple entered his shop, they “requested that Phillips design and
create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”57
Although the majority opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop did
not base its holding on the Free Speech Clause,58 it nevertheless
contains some powerful dicta in support of Phillips’s right not to be
compelled to create custom cakes with messages that offend his
conscience. Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy observed that
although the free speech issue in this case “is difficult, for few
persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought
of its creation as an exercise of protected speech,” Phillips’s claim
“is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen
Id.
Id. See, e.g., Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2006)
(When a created item has both an expressive element and some non-expressive
utilitarian purpose, “a court should then determine whether that non-expressive
purpose is dominant or not.”).
55 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 19.
56 Id. The argument continued:
Phillips is as shielded by the Free Speech Clause as a modern
painter or sculptor, and his greatest masterpieces—his custom
wedding cakes—are just as worthy of constitutional protection
as an abstract painting like Piet Mondrian’s Broadway Boogie
Woogie, a modern sculpture like Alexander Calder’s
Flamingo, or a temporary artistic structure like Christo and
Jeanne-Claude’s Running Fence.
Id. at 20–21. If an artist, such as Mondrian, painted a still life of one of Mr.
Phillips’s cakes, it would be protected artistic expression. If a sculptor, such as
Caldor, sculpted one of Mr. Phillips’s cakes out of clay, it would be protected
artistic expression. Surely, the original cake painted and sculpted by Phillips is
also protected artistic expression.
57 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015)
(emphasis added), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
58 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
53
54
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our understanding of their meaning.”59 Moreover, if a baker refuses
“to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the
marriage,” these additional details “might make a difference.”60 This
free speech dicta in the case leaves behind some very helpful buried
bones to be dug up and applied in a subsequent case involving cake
artists or other expressive wedding vendors.
Though the majority in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not reach
the compelled speech issue in the case, a number of the concurring
opinions did reach the issue. For example, Justice Thomas had a
great deal to say about the issue in his concurring opinion joined by
Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued that “[a]lthough the cake is
eventually eaten, that is not its primary purpose. . . . The cake’s
purpose is to mark the beginning of a new marriage and to celebrate
the couple.”61 Thus, compelling Phillips to create a custom cake
celebrating a same-sex wedding “clearly communicates a
message—certainly more so than nude dancing.”62 Even in the case
of a custom cake without words or symbolic designs, when
Colorado compelled Phillips to make “custom wedding cakes for
same-sex marriages,” it forced him “at the very least, [to]
acknowledge that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and [to]
suggest that they should be celebrated—the precise message he
believes his faith forbids.”63 Justice Thomas concluded that “[t]he
First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring Phillips to
‘bear witness to [these] facts,’ or to ‘affir[m] . . . a belief with which
[he] disagrees.’”64
Justice Kagan took issue with Justice Thomas in her
concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer. Kagan argued that
Phillips’s refusal to bake the cake for the same-sex couple should
not be viewed as refusing to bake a cake celebrating same-sex
marriage, but rather as refusing to supply a product—a cake that is
“simply a wedding cake” —and therefore “one that (like other
standard wedding cakes) is suitable for use at same-sex and
opposite-sex weddings alike.”65 Like a table, chair or napkin, a

Id. at 1723.
Id.
61 Id. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62 Id. (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991)).
63 Id. at 1744.
64 Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos.,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995)).
65 Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
59
60
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wedding cake is merely a utilitarian product, not an expressive
celebration of any particular class of marriage.66
But Justice Gorsuch was having none of this. In his
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, he argued that it is
“irrational” to conclude “that cakes with words convey a message
but cakes without words do not.”67 Indeed, no one can “reasonably
doubt that a wedding cake without words conveys a message.”68
Without regard to the presence of words or “whatever the exact
design,” a wedding cake “celebrates a wedding, and if the wedding
cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a same-sex
wedding.”69 The context of the custom wedding cake determines the
message expressed by the cake artistry.
A perfect example of how context matters in determining the
message of a custom design can be found in Scardina v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc. (“Masterpiece 2.0”).70 Decided only days after the
Supreme Court issued its opinion protecting Mr. Phillips’s religious
liberty in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Complainant in Masterpiece
2.0, Autumn Scardina, requested a custom birthday cake with a pink
interior and a blue exterior.71 The Complainant “explained that the
design was a reflection of the fact that [she] transitioned from maleto-female,” that she “had come out as transgender on [her]
birthday,” and “that the cake was ‘to celebrate a sex-change from
male to female.’”72 Obviously, the message Complainant asked Mr.
Phillips to create through his cake artistry was much more than
“happy birthday.” Rather, he was asked to design a cake expressing
a celebration of male-to-female gender transition, something his
deeply held religious beliefs would not allow him to do.73 Context
matters in speech, and the context here alters the message from a
celebration of a birthday to a celebration of a sex change.74

Id.
Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n June 28, 2018).
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 3.
74 The Colorado Civil Rights Division ruled against Phillips and found that he
violated Complainant’s right to “equal enjoyment of a place of public
accommodation” by declining to create a custom cake celebrating her gender
transition. Id. at 4. Masterpiece Cakeshop and Mr. Phillips responded to this
ongoing threat to their religious liberty and freedom of speech by filing a federal
66
67
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As in the case of a “birthday cake” expressing a message of
celebration for a male-to-female gender transition, so also in the
case of a “wedding cake” celebrating a same-sex marriage. The
context in each case makes clear what is the message expressed by
the custom cake. And when government compels a cake artist to
create cakes expressing messages such as these contrary to his
conscience, it violates the Free Speech Clause and the “no
compelled speech” doctrine that resides at the core of freedom of
speech.
The Commission’s order in Masterpiece Cakeshop creates a
classic unconstitutional condition.75 Colorado requires Phillips to
choose between two constitutional rights: his right to create art he
wishes to create, and his right to refrain from creating art he wishes
not to create. He can have one constitutional right or the other, but
not both. Indeed, in order to comply with the order in this case,
Phillips has stopped creating wedding cakes for anyone.76 His
artistic expression has been chilled—indeed, it has been frozen in its
tracks—by order of the state of Colorado. The First Amendment
does not permit government to put an artist to that odious choice.
Although Masterpiece Cakeshop did not decide Phillips’s
compelled speech claim, the Supreme Court did issue a strong
opinion on the right of individuals not to be compelled “to speak a
particular message” only a few weeks later in National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.77 In Becerra, the state of
California required pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to provide
certain “government-drafted” notices to their clients and in their
advertisements.78 Remarkably, in his concurring opinion in Becerra,
in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch joined, Justice
Kennedy authored a powerful and eloquent manifesto against
California’s attempt to “compel[] individuals to contradict their
civil rights action against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and its
Director, Aubrey Elenis, in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074WYD-STV (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019).
75 See Unconstitutional–Conditions Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (“[T]he government cannot force . . . [a person] to choose between
two constitutionally protected rights.”).
76 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 28 (“[T]he Commission’s order has
forced him to shut down his wedding business completely, slashing his income
by 40%, forcing the loss of most of his staff, and silencing his artistic voice on
marriage.”).
77 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018).
78 Id.
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most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical,
ethical, or religious precepts.”79 Justice Kennedy expressed great
concern that the compelled speech in Becerra amounted to
viewpoint discrimination and described the danger as follows:
This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious
threat presented when government seeks to impose
its own message in the place of individual speech,
thought, and expression. For here the State requires
primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions.
This compels individuals to contradict their most
deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic
philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of
these.80
But what is even more noteworthy is Justice Kennedy’s response to
the self-congratulatory statement by the California Legislature that
“the Act was part of California’s legacy of ‘forward thinking.’”81
Justice Kennedy observed that it is not “forward thinking” to compel
ideological uniformity and continued:
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First
Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the
history of authoritarian government as the Founders
then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows
how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their
attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those
lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the
necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to
come. Governments must not be allowed to force
persons to express a message contrary to their
deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures

Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. When government compels speech—whether it be pledging allegiance to
the flag, expressing an ideological message such as “live free or die,”
recognizing Irish–American gay pride, advertising the availability of subsidized
abortion services, or creating a wedding cake celebrating same-sex marriage—
the compelled message almost always will be a viewpoint that the speaker
wishes not to express. Id.
81 Id.
79
80
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freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils
those liberties.82
What Justice Kennedy said so forcefully in Becerra could
have been said just as powerfully in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Governments are indeed forbidden by the First Amendment from
forcing individuals to say that which they “do not think.”83 And the
decision in Becerra makes clear that the Court is committed to the
“no compelled speech” doctrine of the First Amendment as a
fundamental protection of speakers and artists from authoritarian
government.

III. THE FREE EXERCISE RULING IN MASTERPIECE
CAKESHOP
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith,84 a still-controversial decision from late in the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).’”85 Thus, the general rule of free exercise
under Smith is “that government may prohibit what religion requires
or require what religion prohibits.”86 However, the principal
exception to that general rule, as the Court itself emphasized in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,87 is this:
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral
or not of general application must undergo the most
Id. See also Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018) (striking down laws that require dissenting workers to subsidize
unions). In Janus, the Court once again used powerful language describing the
evil of speech compelled by government. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Alito observed that compelled speech is even more damaging than speech
restrictions, because “[w]hen speech is compelled” by government “individuals
are coerced into betraying their convictions;” thus, “[f]orcing free and
independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always
demeaning.” Id. at 2464.
83 Solzhenitsyn, supra note 28.
84 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85 Id. at 879.
86 Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850,
850 (2001).
87 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
82
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rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the
First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance “‘interests of the highest
order’” and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of
those interests.88
The free exercise issue before the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
then, was whether the general rule of Smith or the important
exception set forth in Lukumi applied to the facts of Phillips’s
religiously-motivated refusal to create a custom wedding cake
celebrating a same-sex wedding.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court, in a strongly-worded
but weakly-reasoned opinion, concluded that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission did not act with “the religious neutrality that the
Constitution requires”89 when applying the public accommodations
law against Phillips, and that therefore its order requiring him to
bake custom cakes for same-sex weddings “violated the Free
Exercise Clause” and “must be set aside.”90 Although the Court
made clear that as “a general rule” religious objections “of business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society” are not
protected “under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law,”91 there are exceptional cases in which the
Free Exercise Clause will protect religious objectors. For example,
although the issue was not before the Court in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the majority observed in dictum that “a member of the
clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds
could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of
his or her right to the free exercise of religion.”92 Apparently this is
a categorical rule and would govern even if the law being enforced
was neutral and generally applicable. Although the Court did not say
so, an exception for the clergy is probably required by the so-called
“ministerial exception” as announced by the Supreme Court in
Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC.93 But by stating it as a categorical rule (even if in dictum) in

Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1727.
92 Id.
93 Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 188 (2012) (stating the ministerial exception is designed to forbid
88
89
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court has brought much-needed clarity
to at least one question about the intersection of gay rights laws and
religious liberty.
Although Phillips is not a member of the clergy, there was
no question that the Commission’s order required him to act
contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs. As Justice Kennedy
explained, “[t]o Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is
contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.”94 However, since the
public accommodations law is facially neutral and generally
applicable, Phillips’s free exercise claim would prevail only if the
law was applied against him in a manner that contravened “the
religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.”95 Based upon the
facts of this particular case, the Court held that Colorado violated
the requirement of neutrality for two reasons.
First, in the course of the Commission’s investigation of the
charge of discrimination lodged against Phillips, certain
commissioners made statements on the record that the Court
interpreted as disparaging Phillips’s religious beliefs. For example,
during the July 25, 2014, meeting of the Commission, one
commissioner disparaged freedom of religion as justifying “all kinds
of discrimination throughout history” including “slavery” and “the
holocaust.”96 This commissioner went on to say that when religious
freedom is employed “to justify discrimination” or “to hurt others,”
it constitutes “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that
people can use.”97 Justice Kennedy was deeply offended by these
expressions of anti-religious bigotry “by an adjudicatory body
deciding a particular case,”98 and concluded that “[t]his sentiment is
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s
antidiscrimination law.”99
Second, and most important, the Commission applied a
double standard when investigating discrimination complaints
government action that “interferes with the internal governance of the church . . .
[and] its beliefs”).
94 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1729 (citation omitted).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1730.
99 Id. at 1729.
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against bakers who refused to create cakes that expressed messages
of which they disapproved. Although the Colorado public
accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
religious “creed” as well as “sexual orientation,”100 the Commission
applied a more lenient standard to claims of religious discrimination
than to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. On at least three
different occasions, cake artists refused to bake cakes with religious
“images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage.”101 Under
the public accommodations law, the state of Colorado conceded that
“[b]usinesses are entitled to reject orders for any number of reasons,
including because they deem a particular product requested by a
customer to be ‘offensive.’”102 The Commission applied this
“offensive product” exception subjectively and on an ad hoc basis,
apparently granting an exception when it agreed with the cake
vendor and refusing an exception when it disagreed with the
vendor.103 Thus, the Commission repeatedly allowed cake artists to
refuse to create “offensive” cakes, even though the customer was in
a protected class—religious “creed”—under the public
accommodations law.104
The three cases involving complaints of discrimination on
the basis of religious “creed” involved the same customer, William
Jack, who asked three different cake shops to bake cakes expressing
his religious beliefs about same-sex marriage. Jack asked the three
cake shops to create custom cakes in the shape of an open Bible with
an image depicting two groomsmen covered by a red “x” and with
Bible verses expressing disapproval of same-sex marriage.105
Although William Jack was clearly a member of a protected class
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. In a civil rights lawsuit filed by
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Mr. Phillips against Colorado officials on August 14,
2018, the Verified Complaint alleges that this “double standard . . . harshly
punishes Phillips while exonerating other cake artists who similarly decline
requests for cakes with messages they deem objectionable.” Complaint at 3,
Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074-WYD-STV (D. Colo.
Jan. 4, 2019).
102 Brief for Respondent at 52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16111).
103 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31 (suggesting that these
decisions were improperly based on “the government’s own assessment of
offensiveness”).
104 Id. at 1728–30.
105 Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n
Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X
(Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No.
P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n Mar. 24, 2015).
100
101
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based upon his religious creed, the Colorado Civil Rights Division
determined that the refusal to create cakes was not based upon that
protected status, but rather because the cake artists deemed the
requested words and images to be “discriminatory,”106 “hateful,”107
or “derogatory.”108 However, when Phillips made exactly the same
argument—that he was willing to sell any other baked goods to gay
customers and that his refusal to bake wedding cakes for same-sex
weddings was not based upon the sexual identity of his customers
but rather his religious beliefs about the definition of marriage—
Colorado ruled against him. As Justice Kennedy put it, “[i]n short,
the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’s religious objection did
not accord with its treatment of these other objections.”109 Thus, this
unequal treatment of Phillips “violated the State’s duty under the
First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a
religion or religious viewpoint.”110 The Free Exercise Clause
requires neutral and generally applicable laws and treatment, and
“bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of
religion.”111 The Court concluded that Colorado’s “disparate
consideration of Phillips’s case compared to the cases of the other
bakers” violated the Free Exercise Clause, and thus the cease and
desist order issued against Phillips “must be set aside.”112
Although the Court’s “neutrality” analysis in Masterpiece
Cakeshop was seriously under-reasoned, it is nevertheless an
important contribution to religious liberty jurisprudence because it
clearly recognizes that “[e]xemptions for secular interests without
exemptions for religious practice reflect a hostile indifference to
religion.”113 Moreover, the Court’s laser-beam focus on Colorado’s
ad hoc process for making subjective evaluations of the
“offensiveness” of a cake’s message as a legitimate reason for a
vendor’s refusal to create a cake for a member of a protected class114
appears to be an important application of a rule, recognized in both
Smith and Lukumi: If the state has in place a system for
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

50.
114

Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X.
Le Bakery Sensual, Charge No. P20140070X.
Gateaux, Charge No. P20140071X.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
Id. at 1731.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1732.
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
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relevant conduct,”115 and if the government grants individualized
exemptions “from its law for secular reasons, then it must grant
comparable exemptions for religious reasons.”116
Religious liberty is particularly vulnerable under such a
subjective ad hoc process because individualized decision-making
by government “provides ample opportunity for discrimination
against religion in general or unpopular faiths in particular.”117 The
risk is great that government officials will not “apply[] a consistent
legal rule” when exercising such unfettered discretion.118 Thus, as
Justice Gorsuch explained,
the Commission’s decisions simply reduce to this: it
presumed that Mr. Phillip[s] harbored an intent to
discriminate against a protected class in light of the
foreseeable effects of his conduct, but it declined to
presume the same intent in Mr. Jack’s case even
though the effects of the bakers’ conduct were just as
foreseeable.119
In other words, in applying its ad hoc process for making subjective
evaluations of the “offensiveness” of a cake’s message as a
legitimate reason for a vendor’s refusal to create a cake for a
member of a protected class, the Commission was guilty of applying
“a more generous legal test to secular objections than religious
ones.”120 Under the Free Exercise Clause, this failure of neutral
treatment requires the officials to justify their double standard under
strict scrutiny and the compelling interest test.121 Moreover, and
once again in the words of Justice Gorsuch,
[b]ut it is also true that no bureaucratic judgment
condemning a sincerely held religious belief as
“irrational” or “offensive” will ever survive strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment. In this country,
the place of secular officials isn’t to sit in judgment

Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
See Laycock, supra note 113.
117 Id. at 48.
118 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1736 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1737.
121 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537
(1993) (stating that the compelling interest test applies when government applies
an individualized exemption process but refuses to recognize religious claims
for exemption). See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized
Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83
NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1187 (2005).
115
116
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of religious beliefs, but only to protect their free
exercise.122
Going forward, free exercise claims by wedding vendors
should focus carefully on subjective tests employed by civil rights
commissions when determining whether a vendor has engaged in
unlawful discrimination or has lawfully declined to supply an
“offensive” product or a cake with an “offensive” message. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that when government
officials allow individualized secular exemptions from a regulatory
standard, it must also extend protection to religious exemption
claims. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,123 Sherbert’s religious
liberty was unequally burdened by South Carolina’s individualized
unemployment compensation process. Thus, the South Carolina law
was neither neutral nor generally applicable because an applicant
was ineligible for unemployment benefits only if the Employment
Security Commission made an ad hoc finding that he or she had
failed without “good cause” to accept “suitable work.”124 Since the
Commission was empowered to grant “good cause” or “suitability”
exemptions to those who had refused work for certain secular
reasons—such as an applicant’s physical fitness, prior earnings, and
prospects for securing local work in his or her customary
occupation—but refused to grant a similar exemption to Sherbert
when she declined employment for religious reasons, the law was
tainted by a discretionary process and, therefore, was not neutral and
generally applicable.125
Similarly, in Lukumi the Court discussed a Florida animal
cruelty law that punished anyone who killed any animal
“unnecessarily.”126 Although this law appeared on its face to be both
neutral and generally applicable, the Court viewed it as representing
“a system of ‘individualized governmental assessment of the
reasons for the relevant conduct,’” because the law required
government officials to decide which animal killings were
“necessary” and which were “unnecessary” when enforcing the
ordinance.127 The Court in Lukumi stated that the compelling interest
test applies whenever a religious-accommodation claim is denied

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1737 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
124 Id. at 400–01.
125 See id. at 400 n.3 (describing the process for granting “good cause” and
“suitability” exemptions).
126 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
127 Id. (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
884 (1990)). Although government officials considered the killing of animals for
religious sacrifice as unnecessary, they considered hunting and many other
secular killings as necessary. Id.
122
123
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under “circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a
general requirement are available.”128
Thus, as Professor Douglas Laycock explained in an article
published before Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided:
A Christian activist named William Jack, who is not
a party to the litigation, smoked out the state of
Colorado and forced it to make explicit what is
usually left to speculation: the refusal to protect
conscientious objectors in these cases is
discriminatory and one sided. Colorado protects
conscientious objectors who support gay rights or
marriage equality, but it does not protect
conscientious objectors who oppose marriage
equality. Because the law is not applied equally, it is
not neutral and generally applicable, and it is
therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause.129
The subjective process the Colorado Commission applied when
deciding whether a conscientious objector has lawfully declined to
create a product because of its offensive message is categorically
non-neutral. The answer to the question whether it is lawful to reject
a product with an offensive message “cannot depend on whether the
state, or the court, agrees with the message.”130 An individualized
and subjective process for determining who is exempt from a
regulatory burden is not a religiously-neutral process, and therefore,
strict scrutiny applies under Lukumi when a religious conscientious
objector is denied an exemption.131
IV. CONCLUSION
Public accommodations laws are being weaponized by
supporters of same-sex marriage to drive religious conscientious
objectors out of business and deprive them of their livelihoods. For
example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins
attempted to use Colorado law not only to demand “the right to live
their own lives by their own values, but also the right to force
religious objectors to assist them in doing so.”132 The issue was not
Id. at 537. See generally Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized
Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts and Religious Liberty, supra
note 121, at 1178–1203.
129 Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
49, 54–55 (2018) (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 57.
131 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
132 Laycock, supra note 1, at 879–80.
128

- 22 -

whether they could obtain a custom wedding cake in the Denver
metropolitan marketplace, but whether Jack Phillips must set aside
his sincerely held religious beliefs to design a wedding cake
celebrating their same-sex wedding.133
This disdain for religious liberty is not accidental; it is a
mainstream opinion among progressive supporters of same-sex
marriage and gay rights.134 In 2013, for example, when Mr.
Phillips’s home state of Colorado passed a civil-union bill covering
same-sex relationships without meaningful protection for religious
liberty, the bill’s sponsor mocked and delegitimized religious liberty
as follows:
So, what to say to those who say religion requires
them to discriminate. I’ll tell you what I’d say. Get
thee to a nunnery and live there then. Go live a
monastic life away from modern society, away from
people you can’t see as equal to yourself, away from
the stream of commerce where you may have to
serve them.135
In other words, religious believers must choose between their
religious beliefs and their livelihoods. If your religion is not
consistent with participating in (and even celebrating) same-sex
relationships, you should close down your business and “get thee to
a nunnery.”136
But religious liberty is not just a trivial consideration that can
be cast aside whenever it gets in the way of the policy preferences
of a majority. Free speech and religious liberty are inalienable civil
rights, fundamental freedoms protected explicitly by the Bill of
Rights. And this is where Masterpiece Cakeshop takes the stage to
remind us that the First Amendment still exists and continues to
protect free speech and religious liberty against restrictions imposed
by majoritarian laws. Jack Phillips did not fight for a right to
“discriminate” against gays and lesbians; he serves all customers,
including gays and lesbians. Like Solzhenitsyn, he fought for the
right to refrain from saying that which he does not think, that which
he does not believe reflects God’s truth about what marriage is and
what it is not.137

Id. at 877 (“All those things are readily available in the market place in most
of the country. The issue is whether the religious conscientious objector must be
the one who provides these things.”).
134 See id. at 870.
135 Id. at 871.
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
133
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Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not base its holding on the Free Speech
Clause, it contains powerful dicta that may be helpful in future
compelled speech cases involving wedding vendors whose services
are expressive.138 Moreover, in Becerra the Court issued a very
strong opinion striking down laws requiring pro-life crisis
pregnancy centers “to speak a particular message.”139 And Justice
Kennedy wrote a powerful concurring opinion in Becerra
denouncing attempts by “authoritarian government” to compel
speech and ideological uniformity.140 Indeed, 2018 was a historic
year for the Free Speech Clause and the “no compelled speech”
doctrine. The next cake artistry case to reach the Court will have a
much easier path to protection under the Free Speech Clause
because of the decisions in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Becerra, and
Janus.141
The Court did rule in favor of Mr. Phillips’s free exercise
claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop, and, although Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion was somewhat under-reasoned, it nevertheless
paves a significant path for religious liberty claims going forward.
The Court held that Colorado’s enforcement of its public
accommodations law against Phillips contravened “the religious
neutrality that the Constitution requires”142 for two reasons. First,
neutrality was compromised because the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission made a number of bigoted statements disparaging
Phillips’s religious beliefs in particular and religious freedom in
general.143
Second, and most important for future free exercise cases,
the Court held that the requirement of neutrality was not satisfied
because the Commission applied a double standard when
investigating discrimination complaints.144 This was so because the
Commission applied a more generous standard to secular bakers
who objected to a cake’s message than to religious bakers asserting
conscientious objections. Because this process for evaluating the
“offensive product” exemption from Colorado’s public
accommodations law was an individualized and subjective one,
See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. Moreover, Justice Thomas
and Justice Gorsuch authored thoughtful and powerful concurring opinions in
support of Phillips’s free speech rights. See supra notes 61–69 and
accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
141 See supra text accompanying note 82 (providing a brief discussion of
Janus).
142 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 96–99.
144 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
138
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strict scrutiny applies when equal exemptions are not extended to
religious conscientious objectors. In short, an individualized and
subjective process for determining who is exempt from a regulatory
burden is not a religiously-neutral process, and therefore triggers
strict scrutiny under Lukumi when a religious conscientious objector
is denied an exemption.145 In future cases involving religious
wedding-vendors charged with violating public accommodations
laws, counsel would be wise to look long and hard at the argument
that an individualized exemption is likely to fail the test of neutrality
under the Free Exercise Clause.
In conclusion, pragmatists may ask why does a man like Jack
Phillips insist on his right not to create a custom cake celebrating a
same-sex wedding? Why not just give in and bake the cake rather
than put your business and livelihood at risk under the public
accommodations law? Perhaps the answer to this question is found
in Robert Bolt’s wonderful play about Sir Thomas More, A Man For
All Seasons.146
In one powerful scene from the play, More’s friends are
encouraging him to obey the King’s command and sign a statement
recognizing the lawfulness of the King’s divorce and remarriage.
Just give in, Thomas, just give in, they beg. And More says this:
“Some men think the Earth is round, others think it is flat; it is a
matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the King’s command
make it round? And if it is round, will the King’s command flatten
it? No, I will not sign.”147 Like Solzhenitsyn, More’s conscience
required him to speak the truth—and only the truth—as he best
understood it. He must refuse to say that which he does not think,
that which he does not believe reflects the truth of what marriage is
in the eyes of God.
Like More, Jack Phillips is a man of deep and sincere
conscience. His conscience will not permit him to use his artistry to
celebrate an event that is not consistent with his understanding of
God’s truth. He should not be treated like an outlaw by his
government.

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN TWO ACTS (Random
House 1990) (1960).
147 Id. at 133.
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